Article 902 pertained to import and export restrictions, the clause reaffirmed the application of GATT provisions, including a prohibition on minimum export-price requirements and, "except as permitted in enforcement of countervailing and antidumping orders," minimum import-price requirements. The article allowed restrictions of imports of energy goods from a third party, provided that in the event such restrictions were applied there would be consultation to avoid "undue interference with or distortion of pricing, marketing and distribution arrangements in the other Party."
Article 903 prohibited the application of export duties or taxes on any energy good not also applied to domestic consumption. At the same time Article 904 prohibited energy export restrictions if such restrictions reduced exports below the level prevailing in the previous 36 month period, and negated the application of higher prices for exports than for products destined for domestic consumption. No restriction of energy exports was allowed that would "require the disruption of normal channels of supply to the other Party or normal proportions among specific energy goods supplied to the other Party...."
Article 906 recognized the legitimacy of government incentives for energy resource development "in order to maintain the reserve base for these energy resources." Pursuant to that notion, Article 907 pertained to national security measures, which allowed either party to restrict trade in an energy good in order to supply a military establishment, respond to armed conflict, implement agreements relating to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, or to respond to "direct threats of disruption in the supply of nuclear materials for defense purposes." Annex 902.5 contained one provision of importance for oil trade, to the effect that the United States would exempt Canada from the 1979 prohibition on the export of Alaskan oil, to a maximum volume of fifty thousand barrels per day, subject to the condition that the oil be transported to Canada not from Alaska but from a "suitable location" within the lower 48 states. Finally, Article 905 provided for consultation in the event either party believed that a regulatory action resulted in discrimination against trade in energy goods.® Clearly, the FTA prohibits the type of government price controls that were introduced in the 1970s under the NEP, involving minimum export price requirements (Article 902) or export taxes (Article 903). Yet, if market forces were to produce a situation in which similar results ensured or in which there was a price difference between domestic and export markets, there would be no violation of the agreement or of GATT regulations. One possible loophole in the prohibition against domestic price controls on crude oil is contained in the provision in Article 904 of the FTA, which allows the exporting country to introduce export restrictions under Article XX of the GATT. That Article stipulates that such restrictions are permissible if they are intended to "ensure essential quantities of such materials to a domestic processing industry during periods when the domestic price of such materials is held below the world price as part of a government stabilization plan," again, as long as such provisions are not ^Canada, Department of Energy, Mines and Resources, The Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement and Energy: An Assessment (Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada, 1988). discriminatory.' At least some authors have concluded that this allows the application of quantitative restrictions to enforce domestic price controls on raw materials.® At the same time, unless they are the product of market forces, export price differentials would be clearly prohibited. As well, under the FTA's prohibition against government imposition of direct export taxes, producers would be the first beneficiary of any additional revenues that resulted from market driven export price increases, although government could tax those profits back. Further, given the basic guarantee under the FTA of uninterrupted supply of energy products, the NEP practice of distinguishing between certain categories, such as heavy versus medium and light crude oil would not likely be allowed under the FTA.' Investment controls and enhanced Canadian ownership were two of the main objectives of Canadian government energy policy in the 1970s and early 1980s. As noted earlier, the Petroleum Incentives Program favoured Canadian over foreign-owned subsidiaries. It has been suggested that the FTA did little to alter a system that gave preferential access to oil resources to Canadian firms. Philip Verlager, Jr., of the Washington Institute of International Economics, for instance, argued in the Energy Journal in 1988 that the absence of firm investment guarantees of equal treatment was a "serious omission."
Verlager contended that a country could not logically pursue a policy of free trade in energy but adhere to a restrictive policy on foreign investment,'" something which should be unacceptable under the "national treatment" principle of the FTA (and of GATT). Nonetheless, although the FTA permits subsidies for exploration and development, such subsidies under Article 1602 of the FTA would have to be applied in a non-discriminatory manner between foreign-owned and Canadian companies. The terms of the FTA also made unacceptable special treatment for Canadian firms in encouraging frontier area exploration and development." On the whole, then, the basic intent of the Reagan administration to achieve a maximum degree of access to Canadian oil resources, without the restrictions of Canadian economic nationalism embodied in FIRA and the NEP, an objective which was consistent with long-standing United States foreign economic policy, was largely realized under the FTA, and it was the desire of the U.S. Government to work toward the removal of any restrictions that remained. On the whole, then, in the area of oil development and trade, tariff barriers were marginal impediments in comparison to government regulation. What was critical was the shift to market forces that preceded the FTA. Although Mexico has thus sought to carve an independent path in the oil industry, it has of necessity been a player on the international scene. Its estimated crude oil reserves in 1987 were over 54 billion barrels, only some 10% of the OPEC countries, but giving it twice the estimated reserves of the United States, and ranking it only slightly behind all of Eastern Europe. By 1991 its proven reserves had risen to 65.5 billion barrels. In 1987 it produced 2.5 million barrels of oil a day (and continued to produce at that level into 1990), representing 4.5% of world production, well ahead of Canada at 1.5 million, Venezuela at 1.6 million, and ahead of all countries in the Middle East except Saudi Arabia's 3.9 million, but behind the 10 million of the United States. With rapidly rising domestic demand, however, during the 1960s Mexico became a net importer of oil, and that remained the situation until the development of new reserves in the southeast of the country in the late 1960s. By the late 1970s that area accounted for over 76% of Mexican production, but the main reserves still lie beneath the shallow waters of the Gulf of Campeche, and the oil produced there is a light, higher grade than the heavier, more sulphurous crude (known as Maya) from Tabasco and Chiapas in the south.Of its production, Mexico exported 1.2 million bbl/day in 1990." United States officials throughout this century have seen the necessity of Mexico playing a strategic role in the event of supply disruptions during international crises; not only does Mexico have large scale production and reserves, but its geographic proximity and land ties to the United States, like those of Canada, make the movement of oil in the event of emergency less vulnerable. The FTA, combined with the 1974 agreements under the International Energy Agency, provides (Article 908) the assurance of Canadian oil supplies to the United States, but no such guarantee currently exists for Mexico, which has considerably higher long-term potential. 
In the 1980s Mexican Presidents Miguel de la Madrid and Carlos Salinas de

